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ABSTRACT
The paper presents a dynamic portfolio model under currency inconver-
tibility which rationalizes the recent Egyptian experience of real exchange
rate appreciation and currency diversification following the increase in
oil exports and the partial financial liberalization that took place after
1976. The two shocks are linked because the relative price of manufacturing
exports in terms of oil is also the premium of the black market rate over
the official exchange rate. The effects of various official exchange rate
policies on the temporary equilibrium values of the premium and the real
wage and on the steady—state values of asset stocks are examined. A review
of the Egyptian experience shows that as the model suggests the official
devaluation of 1979 was ineffective against the "Egyptian disease" so that
little can be expected from the 1981 devaluation. In light of the model
results, a crawling peg policy is proposed instead.
Jorge Braga deMacedo
Assistant Professor of Economics
and International Affairs
Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey 08544The notion of an "economic disease" is frequently used in policy circles,
but it is only recently that it has become popular in open economy macro-
economics. There are now about ahalfdozen models of the "Dutch disease,"1
a catchword for the loss of international competitiveness in manufactures
associated with a boom in natural resource—based exports. As the price of oil
rises relative to the price of manufactured exports, the trade balance of the
oil exporter moves into surplus and this leads to a combination of nominal
exchange rate appreciation and reserve inflows. If the latter are not sterilized,
there is domestic inflation and a decline in export competitiveness. Real
appreciation has also been observed in the context of Southern Cone stabili-
zation plans, entailing a financial liberalization and excessive capital
inflows, as recently described in another collection of models.2 Actually,
the 1979—80 British experience can be seen as an example of Southern Cone—type
excessive capital inflows exacerbating the effects of the oil surplus on the
real price of sterling.3
Instead, in the recent Egyptian experience, oil—induced real appreciation
has been associated with capital outflows and an increase in foreign money
balances held by domestic residents. After Sadat's October Working Paper
called for "the opening" in early 1974, in effect, tight trade and exchange
restrictions were substantially relaxed.4 First, the various premiums and
surcharges on the official exchange rate were consolidated and expanded through
the creation of a "parallel market," where foreign currencywasexchanged at
ratesabout 10% below the ones prevailing in the sizable "gray market" toler-
ated by the authorities. Second, "own" imports, not requiring the purchase
offoreign exchange, were greatly expanded. Third, foreign currency deposits
by domestic residents were allowed at competitive interest rates. Fourth,—2—
current account transactions were gradually moved from the official to the
parallel market. Effective January 1, 1979, raw cotton, rice, petroleum
and petroleum products ceased to he transacted at the old official rate
of 39 piastres per dollar and the parallel rate of 70 piastres became the
new official (unified) exchange rate.5
The Egyptian pound has remained inconvertible for current as well as
capital account transactions and the official foreign exchange market has
continuedto be dominated by the monetary authorities but the existence of
the "gray" market has made it possible for the private sector to build up
foreign currency balancesvia an unreported current account surplus made up
ofmigrants' remittances, tourism and underinvoicing of exports. In short,
while Dutch disease models generally neglect portfolioconsiderations, and
thesame is true of most macro models for developing countries,6 the effects
of real appreciation on the currencycomposition of financial wealth are a
crucialfeature of the "Egyptian disease." On the other hand, the real side
ofthe model presented here is drastically simplified. In particular, a
fundamental aspect of the industrialization of a relatively more absorptive
oil exporter is ignored, namely the effect of the future exhaustion of oil
reserves on capital accumulation.7 The analysis of the effects of partial
financial liberalization on relative prices and currency diversification is
nevertheless useful to understand monetary and exchange rate policy in Egypt,
and, given the increasing reluctance of governments to embark on full interest
rate liberalization, these lessons can be applied to other financially open
relatively more absorptive oil exporters, such as Mexico.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, a simple three—good
two—asset dynamic model of portfolio diversification under inconvertibility is—3—
described. It is shown how the currency ratio changes with the relative
price of a good traded through the official foreign exchange market, taken
to be a natural resource—based export. Policies such as devaluation, exchange
rate unification and a crawling peg are contrasted in this set up. Section II
reviews the recent macroeconomic experience of Egypt and shows that the
implications of the model are consistent with the stylized facts. Finally, the
conclusion suggests better ways of coping with the "Egyptian disease" than
the conventional monetarist cures. Specifically, it is claimed that the recent
official devaluation cannot relieve the symptoms of the disease, whereas the
implementation of an official crawling peg together with the channeling of
manufactured exports at the gray market rate could restore competitiveness and
increase the demand for assets denominated in domestic currency, even without
bringing domestic interest rates to the world level.—4—
I.CURRENCY DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS UNDER INCONVERTIBILITY
1. A three—good, two—asset model
Consider an economy producing and consuming two composite traded goods
and one non—traded good. Theprice of the non—traded good, NT, can be thought
of as a markup over unit labor costs in the usual way. The foreign currency
price of the two traded goods, on the other hand, is determined in the world
market, which allows the aggregation of exports and imports. The two traded
goods are then distinguished by the fact that receipts and payments for one
of them, the "official traded good," are channeled through the official
foreign exchange market, at the official exchange rate ,whilethe other one
ischanneled through the black market for foreign exchange at a rate e, and
will be denoted as the 'smuggled good."8 In fact, rather than a strict
separation between the two goods, most goods are likely to traded in both
markets,depending on the premium of the black market rate over the official
rate. Proceeds from underinvoicing of official exports and the acquisition
of official imports over a particular quantitative restriction are clear
examples of the difficulty in distinguishing goods by the applicable exchange
rate. While the introduction of this aspect is straightforward, it is not
essential to the story and it is therefore left out.9 In this connection it
is more useful to interpret the official traded good as a natural resource—
based export and the "smuggled good" as comprising manufactured exports as well
as the usual invisible transactions that are more likely to evade the official
channel. All that matters then is that the existence of a sufficient flow
of unreported current invisibles allows the black market exchange rate to
be seen by exporters as the rate applicable to their transactions, so that the
premium becomes a measure of the export subsidy that would make exporters—5—
indifferent between the two channels.
We therefore have two relative prices. Choosing the official traded





where P =w(l+),being a markup and w unit labor costs.
If the factors of production are fully employed, domestic supply of
each one of the three goods only depends on the two relative prices. Domestic
consumption, on the other hand, will be taken to depend on goods prices,
nominal income andnominal wealth——to be defined below. Ifdemand is
homogeneousofdegree zero in prices and income, consumption can be expressed
as a function of relative prices p and q and wealth in terms of the numeraire.10
Excess demand functions, also homogeneous of degree zero, can then be defined.
In fact the excess supply of the official traded good will be the reported
trade surplus (RCAB) while the unreported trade surplus (UCAB) equals the
excess supply of the smuggled good. We will assume that the market for non—







where =W/P0is real wealth.
Wealth is composed of two assets, domestic money, M, and foreign money, F.
Foreign money is valued at the black market rate in investor's portfolios,
while domestic money represents the foreign assets of the central bank, FG,
valued at the official exchange rate plus the stock of domestic assets of
the central bank, C.'1 Ignoring the banking system for simplicity (or
interpreting M as high powered money) we have:
(6) MC + FG
(7) W=M+eF
Now interpreting reported capital flows as transfer payments,
which are included in RCAB, and assuming also that the stock of private
foreign assets can only change by an unreported trade surplus, we have the
change in asset stocks described by:
(8) F =B(p,q,)
(9) M =C+ B(p,q,W)
Valuing the domestic money stock in terms of the numeraire and using (3)
we can rewrite (9) as
(9') M=B+6M
where M M/P° is the real money stock
and =C/N—P°is the real increase in domestic credit creation.
Given the foreign currency price of the official traded good,P° is simply
the rate of crawl of the official exchange rate.—7—
Now, given financial wealth, the private sector chooses its currency
composition based on relative returns, transactions and wealth (with a unit
elasticity for convenience). Transactions demands can be proxied by the prices
of the goods. It will be assumed that an increase in the prices of the
official traded good and the non—traded good increase the demand for domestic
money while an increase in the price of the smuggled good increases demand for
foreign money. Expressing asset demand fluctuations in terms of the numeraire,
and eliminating the demand for domestic money by the wealth definition in
(7) we write portfolio balance as
*+ +-
(10) pFh(R +i — R,p,q)M
*
where R(R )isthe nominal return to the domestic (foreign) money
and is the expected rate of change of the black market rate.
In most of what follows the relative returns will be exogenous and
indeed the interest account on private foreign assets will be subsumed into
UCAB.12 Reference can be made,however, to the consequence of allowing an
endogenous expected rate of change of the black market rate as a measure of
relative returns, r.13 The first assumption is that expectations depend on the
level of the black market premium
(11) =g(p)
Depending on whether g' is positive or negative, we will have regressive or
extrapolative expectations. From (11) we have
(12) p=pp—8—
where p is the elasticity of expectations.
The alternative assumption is perfect foresight, according to which
(13)




The model is now complete in its outline. Given asset stocks, and expectations,
equations (5) and (10) determine the temporary equilibrium values of the two
relative prices. Given relative prices, and expectations, equations (8) and
(9') determine the steady—state values of the asset stocks. Expectations can
be made endogenous by using either (12) or (14).
2.Temporary equilibrium
The temporary equilibrium values of p and q are obtained from (5) and (10)
above. From (5), an increase in q creates an excess supply of the non—traded
good, which, given asset supplies, can only be offset by an increase in the
black market premium. The combination of p and q consistent with equilibrium
in the non—traded goods market are thus given by an upward sloping locus in
p,q space, drawn as NT in Figure 1.From (10), an increase in q generates a
decreased demand for foreign assets. Given asset supplies and expectations,
this implies a decrease in the premium, so that the combinations of p and q
consistent with portfolio balance are given by a downward sloping locus, PB





the demand for foreign assets (or if the effect of the premiumthereon
were larger than the valuation effect), the portfolio balance locus would
be upward sloping.
14
In any case, the slope of the NT locus (which has the "own" price
effect on the non—traded goods market in the numerator) is steeper than a ray
through the origin defining the price of the smuggled good in terms of the
non—traded good, p/q. At the intersection of the NT and PB loci, the system
is in temporary equilibrium with relative prices p0 and q0. To ascertain
the effects of changes in asset stocks and expectations on the temporary
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where =pF/Wis the share of foreign assets in wealth;
is the positive elasticity of demand for foreign
assets with respect to the premium (the relative price
of non—traded goods, relative returns) e.g. sf/f
E2q/q
=—WN/Wisthe positive semi—elasticity of the excess supply
of non—traded goods with respect to real wealth;
is the positive semi—elasticity of the excess supply of
non—traded goods with respect to the premium (the relative
price of non—traded goods), e.g. l =p/p—11—




As indicated, the slope of the NT locus is positive and greater than
p/q, while the PB locus will be downward sloping if the valuation effect
of p dominates, so that:
(16) l-c >s1
Thuscondition (16) puts as an upper bound on the premium elasticity
of the share of foreign assets in wealth the share of domestic money in
wealth: if domestic money is 80% of wealth, the elasticity has to be less
than .8.
15
If the premium elasticity were at its upper bound the PB wnuld
be vertical.
The effect of an increase in the demand for foreign assets on the
temporary equilibrium can be seen by going back to Figure 1. From T, an
increase in the return to foreign currency (increase in iJ)willshift PB
up: given asset stocks, an increase in q would reduce the demand for foreign
assets,while an increase in pwould increase the valuation of the existing
stock(sincethis effect dominates by assumption). The NT locus does not
shift,so that the tworelative prices increase to T1, p increasing by more
than q. Conversely, an increase in F shifts the PB locus down, while it
shifts the NT locus to the right because an excess demand for non—traded goods
implies an increase in its relative price, or a decline in the black market—12—
premium.As a consequence p has to decrease to accomodate anincrease in
Fbutq may increase or decrease. In any event, p/q falls. In Figure 1,
it is assumed that the PB curve shifts by more so that q is also smaller at
T2. To ascertain this, solve (15) given relative returns and write it
compactly as:
IP1 MF1 H (15') =
L






Itis clear from (15') that, if condition (15) holds and A >0
as assumed,'6 then <0and <0,the case depicted in Figure 1.Similarly,
and increase in M will unambiguously raise > 0)but it may increase or
decrease p.In fact the increase in N shifts the PB locus up because it
generates an increase in the demand for foreign assets and requires an
increase in p or in q to maintain portfolio balance. The effect on the NT
locus is the same as the effect of an increase in F, it shifts to the right
and requires an increase in q or a decrease in p .Thecondition for both
q and p to increase (or for >0)as shown in Figure 1 by T3, is the dominance
of the "own"effectin the non—traded goods market, or:
(17) >—13—
Even when pincreases,however, it will only increase by more than q if




Theeffect of a once—and—for—all devaluation of the official rate is to
lower p, q andin proportion. This will generate an excess demand for
non—traded goods if >l+,sothat the NT locus will shift to the
right to maintain equilibrium and q will not decline in proportion. The
effect on the demand for foreign assets hinges on whether the demand effect
of the premium is stronger than the valuation effect of the premium plus the
demand effect of the relative price of non—traded goods. In particular, demand
for foreign assets will decrease if >' sothat the PB locus will shift
down,thetemporary equilibrium of the system will jump from T to T3, and
p,q and p/q will fall, just like when F increases.'7
3.Steady—state equilibrium
The dynamics are governed by (8) and (9') above. Substituting for p




In long—run equilibrium, when B0, since the non—traded goods
market and the asset markets are always in equilibrium, we have to have
B =0as well. This implies an equilibrium relationship between credit—14—
creation and the rate of crawl, such that=0 .Takinga linear approxi—
*
mation of the system around the steady—state values M and F (and assuming






where = +U) 1 +-1)
J Pq+W1+a(P+1)
and Tf(p,w) is the positive semi—elasticity of the current accounts
withrespect to the premium (relative price of non—traded goods,
realwealth) e.g. 'ii =—pB/p=pB/Bp
Thedeterminant of the Jacobian in (21) is positive and given by:
(22) DET 2Tr(l- > 0
Similarly, if V2 and r are large relative to and w1, the trace




Thedominance of the own effect has to be stronger than assumed in
signing (23) for the two diagonal elements in (21) to be negative and the—15—
twooff—diagonal terms to be positive. Assuming that this is the case,
the two loci where M =0and ] =0will be positively sloped. And, because
of condition (22), the F =0locus will be steeper than the H =0locus in
M, F space, as depicted in Figure 2. As shown by the arrows, above the
M =0locus, the reported current account has a deficit larger than real
domestic credit creation and real money balances are decreasing, while
below they are increasing. Above the F =0locus the unreported current
account is in surplus and the private stocks of foreign assets is increasing,
while below it is decreasing. Steady—state equilibrium obtains at A with
asset stocks F and N. Note from (10) that a ray through the origin has
slope p/h.
Consider first the long run effects of an exogenous increase in the demand
for foreign assets, from a position of equilibrium at A. As shown above,
given asset supplies, p and q go up. This moves the reported current account
into deficit, so the M =0locus shifts to the right, and (if the "own" effect
dominates) the unreported current account into surplus so the F =0locus also
shifts to the right. As shown in the Appendix, at the new steady—state (A1),
thereis a larger currency ratio. Consider next the effect of a once—and—for—all
devaluation of the official rate from A1,whichdecreases p and q (as well as
p/q).This brings the reported current account into surplus and the unreported
currentaccount into deficit, so that M has to increase (or F has to decrease) to
restorebalance. Thus the N =0locus shifts up and the F =0locus shifts to
the left, while the premium also increases, moving the economy to A3, where the
currency ratio is the same as at A1. Conversely, from A2, a decrease in S
shifts the M =0locus down because a decline in M (or an increase in F) will
improve the reported current account to compensate for the decreased domesticM
—16—
Figure 2








credit creation. The F =0locus does not shift so that if the N =0locus
shifts back to A1 the new steady—state will have a lower currency ratio.
Thus, unlike devaluation, a crawling peg can decrease the steady—state currency
ratio. The reason for this difference lies in the effect of the two measures
on real balances. The improvement in the reported current account due to a
once—and—for—all devaluation increases real balances (in proportion) while
the crawling peg decreases them.
18
Consider finally the effects of exchange rate unification. If unification
is accompanied by a floating official exchange rate, central bank reserves do
not change, portfolio balance is described by (10) above with p= 1, domestic
money is given and the change in the stock of foreign assets is equal to the
aggregation of the reported and unreported current account, so that we have
the conventional portfolio model with non—traded goods.19 If unification were
accompanied by a fixed but fully—convertible official exchange rate, on the
other hand, domestic and foreign money would become perfect substitutes and
we could apply the simple monetary approach to the balance of payments. It
is,however, difficult to believe that such a policy would becredible without
fullinterest liberalization so that the reasons for the development of a black
market for foreign exchange would probably remain and the private valuation of
foreign currenc\ would still differ from the official exchange rate, with the
consequences suggested above.
We now proceed to review the recent Egyptian experience and to interpret
it in light of the results of the model.—18—
II. THE EGYPTIAN EXPERIENCE
The philosophy of the October Working Paper may not have succeeded in gener-
ating a private entrepreneurial class that would replace the bureaucracy of the
Nasser era: private investment is still less than 20% of the total. Never-
theless, the opening of the Egyptian economy is unquestionable. Imports and
exports increased from 15% and 21% of GNP in 1972—73 to 44% and 53% in the
late 1970's.2° In 1979, furthermore, the increased oil revenues, Suez Canal
dues and reported migrants reached 17% of GNP, accruing mostly to the govern-
ment rather than to the private sector. If reported capital flows are also
interpreted as tranfer payments, balance of payments data shows a reported
transfer from abroad partly offset by an unreported private capital outflow.
Given that the propensity to save in Egypt is probably less than in its trading
partners, the net income effect of the reported transfer is expansionary. Coupled
with the effect of emigration on the supply of skilled labor, the transfer also
explains that real unit labor costs in manufacturing have been rising faster
than abroad. In short, the recent Egyptian experience can be seen as the
response of relative goods prices and the currency composition of financial
wealth to two shocks: an increase in the price of the official traded good
and an increase in the return to foreign assets.
Even though there has been some concern about the decline in export compe-
titiveness and the increase in currency diversification that are at the heart of
the "Egyptian disease,t' these do not seem to bother the authorities as much as the
acceleration of consumer price inflation from about 10% pa. to perhaps 30% in
1980 (taking into account the free market price of some controlled commodities),
first because attempting to stabilize the price of wage goods has involved an—19—
increasing share of government expenditure. The policy measures of May 1980
addressed the decline in real wages that came as a consequence of inflation
both by an increase in labor compensation and by an increase in the subsidy
of some essential consumer goods. These measures have thus required govern-
ment credit creation both to sterilize the deterioration in the foreign
asset position of the Central Bank in 1977 and 1978 and not to sterilize the
improvement in 1979 and 1980.
It is therefore no wonder that most analyses of Egyptian monetary
problems rely on conventional open economy monetarism, ignoring the two basic
features of the "Egyptian disease." To illustrate the conventional view,
define monetary equilibrium from the quantity equation and the purchasing
power parity hypothesis. Then, using changes in an average official import
exchange rate against the dollar (taking into account the gradual shift of
goods from the official to the parallel rate between 1975 and 1978 to be
described below) plus U.S. consumer price inflation as a proxy for the world
pound inflation, and the Egyptian CPI as a proxy for domestic inflation,
we do get a clear monetarist message for the period 1975—78: money growth
(24—30% p.a.) exceeded real output growth (19% p.a.) so domestic inflation
(about 10%) was bound to catch up with world pound inflation (13—14%). But
then the official devaluation (15% in 1978 and 30% in 1979) implied monetary
contraction at world prices (—8% and —26% respectively) even though inflation
continued to be repressed at 10—15% p.a. Nevertheless, domestic inflation
exploded in 1980 as "equilibrium" inflation dropped to the fixed exchange
rate level of U.S. inflation. As a consequence, monetary contraction at
domestic prices was exacerbated, while there was 12% excess money creation at
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Sources: W from Appendix Table 2, line 1; e from Appendix Table 1, line 3
P,P.' from Appendix Table 1, line 6; y from Bhattacharya
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currency diversification qualifies the simply monetarist cure of reducing
credit creation so as to bring "money growth" to the level implied by nominal
output growth at world prices,21 it is useful to take a closer look at the
deviations from purchasing power parity, that is to say at export competi-
tiveness.
A common measure of international competitiveness is provided by unit labor
costs relative to major trading partners. For a semi—industrialized country such
as Egypt, this measure should be interpreted with caution since the comparison
of unit labor costs with, say, the United States, has to be made relative to
an arbitrary base period, and has to ignore the implications for laborpro-
ductivity of the substantial sectoral reallocations that are likely to take
place as a consequence of industrialization. Furthermore, the existence of
multiple exchange rates has to be taken into account. This is done in Chart 2,
where unit labor costs in manufacturing relative to the U.S. are reported at
both the average official export exchange rate and the gray market rate
(see Appendix Table 1). The gain in competitiveness achieved by the gradual
unification of 1977—79 is evident from the chart, as well as the appreciation
of the official rate in 1980, but the striking feature is the deterioration
in competitiveness of the goods valued at the gray market rate, whose relative
costs in late 1980 were 30% above the ,base period level. The chart also
shows relative real unit labor costs. The difference between these and unit
labor costs is simply the change in either nominal exchange rate and a relative
price index: the continued appreciation of the real gray market rate is evident
from the widening distance between the two top curves in Chart 2.22
Now the share of foreign currency deposits in commercial banks rose from
8% of total (public and private) deposits in 1976 to 19% at the end of 1978—22--
Chart 2
Measures of Relative Prices
(indices 1975 =100)
— — relativereal unit labor costs in manufacturing
—.— relativeulcm at gray market exchange rate
—x— relative ulcm at average official export exchange rate
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and during the same period the premium of the gray market rate over an
average official export rate (which takes into account the gradual shift
of goods from the official to the parallel market) declined from 55% to
31%. After the unification, however, the gray market rate began to
follow the rising foreign interest rates and the premium on the unified
(parallel) rate increased steadily until mid—1980. At that time, the decline
in foreign interest rates as well as the announcement by the government that
customs dues on imported goods could again be paid for in local currency led
to a drop in the premium to about 10% (Chart 3).But soon after the premium
returned to over 20% and it reached 27.5% in mid—1981, to drop to less than
7% after the July devaluation which brought the unified rate to 83—84 piastres
and raised interest rates from 7.5% to 10%. The increasing return differential
also induced further currency diversification. Private holdings of foreign
currency are hard to measure because of widespread hoarding of foreign bank
notes, and substantial private foreign currency deposits in business and
investment banks, and offshore banks.24 Nevertheless, the currency ratio
(private foreign currency deposits in commercial banks over domestic money
supply) reached 15% at the end of 1979 and has continued to increase since
then (Appendix Table 2).25
Behind this accumulation of foreign currency balances is a substantial
change in the pattern of financing of a current account deficit around $1.5
million (Appendix Table 3). There has been a rise in the "autonomous"
component of the capital account (which includes direct investment, suppliers
credits and other private non—monetary operations as well as long term aid)
from about $1.3 billion in 1977 to about $2.5 billion in 1980, the increase
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Law 43 firms, being particularly noteworthy. This has more than matched
the decline in special balance of payments financing loans and grants to the
Government from $1.6 billion in 1977 to zero in 1979 and 1980, which was
largely due to non—economic considerations. The balance on non—monetary
transactions has therefore been in surplus and the net foreign asset position
of the monetary institutions has accordingly improved. In 1980 central bank
reserves increased almost $1 billion, while foreign assets held by commercial
banks declined by one third of this amount. In fact, from 1974 to 1976 and
againin 1980 commercial banks were borrowing abroad hi1e on net they were
repaying loans and placing funds in external financial markets between 1977
and1979. At the same time, there has been a growing "unallocated" capital
outflow: less than half of the commercial banks' outflow in 1977, it more
than offset commercial bank borrowing in 1980, so that, even after accounting
for errors and omissions, due to current account transactions, a sizeable
private (non—bank) accumulation of foreign assets remains.
Against this background, the stylized facts of the "Egyptian disease"
are apparent from Chart 4: on the left panel we plot the shocks——the
increase in pound oil revenues and the return differential, on the right
panel we plot the responses——real appreciation and currency diversification.
Deviations from purchasing power parity were already discussed in connection
with Charts 1 and 2.Now Chart 4 suggests that defining money correctly will
substantially reduce the rate growth of the money stock. Indeed conventional
monetary equilibrium would obtain in 1980, rather than the 12% increase in
excess money creation reported in Chart 1. The results from the model in
the previous section——gathered for convenience in Table 1——provide a ration-


































































































































































































































































































































































The "Egyptian Disease": Model Results
return
differentjal(r) + + + + +
o il price (P°)
+ +—28—
explanation, even after the corrections suggested. It is clear from the
table that the return differential in favor of the foreign currency increases
the currency ratio but causes real depreciation while the increase in the
domestic currency price of the official traded good causes real appreciaton
but has no steady—state effect on the currency ratio: it is the coincidence
of the two shocks that explains the two responses of Chart 4.It was shown
above, however, that a crawling peg would succeed in lowering the currency
ratio, while an official revaluation could temporarily offset increases in
P. In short, allowing manufactured exports at a rate closer to the gray
market seems to be the only way to preserve export competitiveness, fight
inflation and prevent a continued increase in the currency ratio.
Conclusion
The present stance of the government to try and eliminate currency
diversification by a new unification——or at least by a once—and—for—all
devaluation——is obviously misguided. The financial openness that Egypt has
achieved makes it impossible for the government to control the stock of
foreign assets of the private sector. The existence of a black market
premium naturally follows from the reluctance to raise interest rates. If
the crawling peg is implemented——possibly after a once—and—for—all revaluation——
it may stabilize the black market rate somewhat, but it is the earlier
practice of allowing exports at the black market rate, rather than the
ensuing unification, that should be followed.
Even though these conclusions would need to be checked by a model
with real capital formation, the major point can be restated: invisible
receipts in an oil exporting country are likely to be diverted from the—29—
official exchange market so that, in order to avoid full interest libera—
lization andreal appreciation, official exchange rate policy has to reduce
the incentives to hold foreign assets. Since an official once—and—for—all
devaluation does not alter these incentives, a crawling peg policy suggests
itself.—30—
NOTES
*Earlier versions were presented at the World Bank, the State Department, the
Williams Development Conference, and the N.B.E.R. Summer Tnstitute. Comments
from the participants and encouragement from Kema1 Dervis are gratefully
acknowledged. Errors are my own.
1. See Corden (1981), Corden and Neary (1980), van Wijnbergen (1981a), Boutros—
Ghali (1981), and Buiter and Purvis (forthcoming). Corden (1980) credits
TheEconomistwith the invention of the term and states that in Australia
it is knownas"the Gregory problem."
2.See Diaz (1981), van Wiinbergen (1980), Krugman (1980a), Dornhusch (1980,
Chapter 12) and further references to the Argentine experience in Calvo (1981).
3.See Corden (1980).
4. On the economic experience since "the opening," see Ikram et al (1978),
Dervis et al (1980) and Bruton (1981).
5. As Pick's Currency Yearbook(1978,p. 201) writes in characteristic style:
"Unable to 'beat' the black market, Cairo finally decided to 'join' it."
6. Taylor (1979, Chapter 9). A portfolio model of the Portuguese black market
rate was estimated in Macedo (1979b); for the "dollarization" of Mexico,
see Solis and Ortiz (1981). A currency substitution model of Egypt is in
Boutros—Ghal i (1980).
7. See Dixit (1981) and van Wijnbergen (1981b).
8. The parallel with the dual exchange market literature is evident. See
references in Macedo (l98lb).
9. See Macedo (l979a) for a model incorporating this feature.
10. See demonstration in Macedo (198lb).
11. Domestic credit creation, in particular to the public sector, is thus exo-
genous and, in particular, capital gains and losses on foreign exchange—31—
reserves are offset by changes in central Mnk net worth. For the case
discussed in the Addendum to Johnson (1976) that these induce credit crea-
tion, see Macedo (1979a).
12. The importance of this assumption in models of dualexchange rate systems
has been emphasized by Marion (1977)
13. See Macedo (1961b) for the demonstration that icapturesrelative returns.
14. This is assumed in Macedo (l979a). It does not change the main results.
15. For evidence on these proportions for major currencies, see Macedo (1981a).
16. If condition (16) does not hold, it is unlikely that >0 becausev2 cap-
tures the "own" price effect in the non-traded goods market, which is lar-
ger than the "cross" price and the wealth effects, captured by
v1and
respectively.
17.Conversely, if the PB locus will shift UI) and the equilibrium will
be at T3, with a higher p, q and p/q, just like in t:he case of an increase
in M .Sincethis case is implausible, we see that2 also has an upper
bound given by condition (16) in the text.
18. Calvo (1979) elaborates on the differences between and once—and—for—all
devaluation and an increase in the rate of crawl.
19. Sec Kourl(1981)and Calvo and I:odriguc.z (1977).
20.Politicaleconomy views are in Taylor (1977) and Waterbury (1981), but there
still is no systematic study of the trade and payments regimen such as the
one by 1Iarisen and asnash:ib (3975) for tue Nasser period. Sec also the
references, in footnote (4)aboveand Bhattacharya et al. (1980).
21 .Thereareofecu r;u, otTer reasons to qua 1. ify this a rtumen t .Thus,ac-cord—
ing to Nccnz in (1 979) and Croskett and Evans (1 9h0),theincome elast iciLy
of monce deaand mit be closer to two than to one. Alt ernat ivc]y, even—32—
for low interest rate elasticities, Krugman (1980b) has shown that (com-
plete) price rigidity during two to four years would lead real apprecia-
tion to be magnified by a factor of similar magnitude.




where w(w*) is the wage rate in manufacturing,
L(L*)ismanufacturing employment,
Q(Q*)isindustrial production,
p(p*) is the consumer price index,
TJLC =wL/Q(ULC*) is unit labor cost in manufacturing,
and z =e, the exchange rates in the gray and official markets
respectively.
The index in chart 4 is therefore obtained by multiplying lines 9 and 5
in Appendix Table 1.
23. Excluding earmarked deposits. Including these would not make much differ—
ence in 1978, but the share would increase to 28% in 1979.
24. Decisions regarding the currency denomination of financial wealthare not
restricted to the differential between Egyptian pound and Eurodollar rates.
Changes in otl:r Eurocurrency rates and in the expected exchange rates
between major currencies will indeed be more important if the wealth—holder's
consumption basket includes only a small share of goods produced in Egypt.
See Macedo (1981a).
25. Monetary statistics in Egypt are notoriously defective. Tobegin with,
they exclude business and investment banks as well as offshore banks (which—33—
only deal in foreign currency) ,and even for commercial banks (which include
four belonging in the Government's foreign exchange budget and a number of
joint venture banks) foreign currency deposits have only been available since
the exchange rate unification. In terms of domestic currency assets and ha--
bilities, the statistics generally include public sector companies on the
groundsthat they behave like private companies (and may nowhaveprivate
equityparticipation). However, it has beenarguedthat their deposits
should be excluded from the money suppay in order to calculate a more mean-
ingful public sector borrowing requirement; this approach is followed in
Appendix Table 1. See the discussion in McKenzie (1979) and Bhattacharva
et al (1980).33a
Using (5) to substitute for q in (8), (9') and (10) and totally differen—
tiatin, taking into account that aside from changes in Jiand we have an
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The determinant is given by
A =2(i—a)rQ- 211i ,>
0








so thatp=0ii 0 .lE;o(A/L3)h/ 2ah -(n--u1)M
Thc othcr resu] Lsaresimi] any dcrived.—34—
Appendix Table 1
Exchange Rates and Prices
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1. Gray market rate: 1.34 1.35 1.30 1.29 1.20
($/E)
2. Average official rate:
$// E
a) export 2.01 1.89 1.72 1.43 1.43
b) import 2.21 2.10 1.85 1.43 1.43
3.Consumer price inflation 10 13 11 15 30
%p.a.
4. Wage bill in manu— 485 555 620 770 975
facturing and mining:
E million
5. Value of industrial 993 1120 1319 1478 1833
product ion:t E million,
indices base 1978 =100
6.Consumer prices relative 94 99 100 101 110
to U.S. at gray market
rate
7.Labor share in manu— 104 106 100 111 113
facturing (5)1(6)
8.Unit labor costs at the 86 100 100 128 158
gray market rate
9. Labor share in manu— 104 106 100 114 117
turing relative to U.S.
10. Dollar unit value of oil 87 95 100 202 242
Sources: 1.1976—78 International Reports, Inc. average of weekly data.
1979—80 ownestimatesaverage of monthly data.
2.Computed from rates in Dervis et al. (1980, Table B.3) and
shares in dollar current account, ibid. (Table B.9).
3. 1976—78 CAPMAS, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 1979—80 ownestimates.
4. Ministry of Planning, adjusted for bonuses (9% in 1979,
25% in 1980).—35—
Appendix Table 1, continued
5.1976—79:National Accounts Data from Ministry of Planning,
1979—80 Ministry of Industry.
6.Index from (3)* index from (1)/IFS, U.S. line 64.
8.((7)/(6))*U.S. inflation
9. U.S. lines (65 ey* 67. .c)/(64*66. .c).
10. Egypt General Petroleum Corporation. 1980 June.—36—
Appendix Table 2
Domestic and Foreign Money
(end of year)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1.Money including foreign2.4 3.2 4.1 5.3 7.11
currency deposits
(E billion)
2.Money excluding foreign2.22 2.92 3.7 4.6 5•91
currency deposits
(E billion)
3.Premium of gray market .97 .96 1.00 1.03 1.09
over parallel rate
index 1978=1
4.Currency ratio at 9 10 11 15 20
parallel rate
(1)— (2)1(2):%
5.Currency ratio at 9 10 11 15 22
gray market rate
(4) *(3)
6.Interest differential 2 3 5 8 10
on 3 month time
deposits
Sources: 1. Central Bank of Egypt. Includes earmarked deposits.
2. Central Bank of Egypt, IMF, ownestimates(starred), excludes
earmarked deposits.
3.End of year gray market rate same sources as Appendix Table 1,
line 1.
6. 1976—78 McKenzie (1979), 1979—80 ownestimates,euro
dollar rate from World Financial Markets.
Notes: 1. Extrapolated from September data in 1980 and 1979.
2. Ownestimates.—37--
Appendix Table
Summary Balance of Payments
($Million)
1977 1978 1979 1980*
1. Current Account —1519 —1415 —1572 —1355
2. Autonomous non—monetary
transactions 1270 1582 2269 2450
3.tTOverall"balance (1 + 2) —251 167 697 1095
4. Unallocated —435 —504 —462 —415
5. Special Financing 1601 809 72 —
6.Monetary operations —915 —472 —307 —630
a. Commercial banks —1005 —494 —101 280
b. Central bank 90 22 —206 —910
*
estimated
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, TNT, IBRD, own estimates.—38—
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